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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CHARLOTTE HANKS WURST, 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, 
vs. Case No. 900249-CA 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL Category No. 7 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, and PEPPERMILL RESORT 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Petitioner, The Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of 
Utah, Department of Employment Security, respectfully petitions 
this Court for a rehearing in the above-entitled case. The Board 
of Review concurs with the Court's disposition of the matter 
except for the Court's remanding the case to the Board of Review 
for additional findings of fact regarding whether the claimant is 
entitled to benefits under the equity and good conscience provi-
sions of the Utah Employment Security Act. 
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DISPOSITION BY THIS COURT 
In an Opinion filed on May 2, 1991 in the case of Char!otte 
Hanks Wurst v. Department of Employment Security, No. 90024 9-CA, 
slip op., this Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Review 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah, which held that the claim-
ant left her employment to follow her spouse to a new locale. 
This Court then remanded the matter for entry of appropriate 
findings on the issue of the claimant's entitlement to benefits 
under the equity and good conscience provisions of the Utah 
Employment Security Act (hereinafter the A c t ) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of the case have been stated previously by the 
parties in their respective Briefs. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SECTION 35-4-5(c) OF THE ACT CITED BY THIS COURT 
AS THE OPERATIVE PROVISION IN THIS MATTER, IS NOT 
APPLICABLE. 
The Court of Appeals 1 decision cites §35-4-5(c) of the Act 
as the operative provision in this matter, claiming the claimant 
seeks unemployment insurance compensation under this provision. 
In fact, neither party made reference to § 3 5 - 4 - 5 ( c ) . Section 
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35-4-5(c) deals with a refusal to accept referral to or an offer 
of "suitable work". 
The operative provision in this case, as briefed by both 
parties, is §35-4-5(a) of the Act which deals with the situation 
of employees who have ended their employment relationship by 
quitting their jobs. Section 35-4-5(a) is a disqualifying provi-
sion; if a claimant is ineligible under that section, he or she 
cannot negate that disqualification by qualifying for unemploy-
ment insurance benefits under some other provision of the Act. 
POINT II 
IT IS NOT THE INTENT OF THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECU-
RITY ACT TO GRANT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS 
UNDER EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE IN "QUIT TO 
ACCOMPANY SPOUSE" CASES. 
Utah Unemployment Insurance Rule R475-5a-3 spells out the 
elements necessary for an allowance of benefits under equity and 
good conscience as follows: 
When the circumstances of the quit were not 
sufficiently compelling to justify an allow-
ance of benefits for good cause, but there 
were mitigating circumstances, and a denial 
of benefits would be unreasonably harsh or an 
afront (sic) to fairness, benefits may be 
allowed under the provisions of equity and 
good conscience if all of the following ele-
ments are present: 
a. the decision is made in cooperation with 
the employer by giving the employer an oppor-
tunity to provide information; 
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b. the claimant acted reasonably; 
c. a denial would be inconsistent with the 
intent of the unemployment insurance program; 
and 
d. the claimant demonstrated a continued 
attachment to the labor market, (Emphasis 
added.) 
In the majority of quit to accompany spouse cases determined 
by the Department of Employment Security, elements "a", "b" and 
"d" are satisfied in terms of claimant eligibility under equity 
and good conscience. In every Department decision on separation 
issues, employer input is sought and taken into account. Employ-
ers are sent notices of the proceedings and are invited to parti-
cipate, so this element of establishing an equity and good con-
science allowance is, almost without exception, met in every 
case. There are very few instances where it would be reasonable 
for a claimant to stay behind when his/her spouse is moving out 
of the locale. In virtually every quit to accompany spouse case 
it must be concluded that the claimant has acted reasonably in 
quitting a job to join or move with a spouse in order to avoid 
the financial stress of maintaining two households, the breaking 
up of a family, and the devastating emotional consequences for 
both spouses and children of being apart, all of which evidence 
the reasonableness of the decision to quit as the term "reason-
able" is used in the equity and good conscience provision. Fin-
ally, in many quit to accompany spouse cases, claimants will 
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demonstrate a continued attachment to the labor market (though 
not in the present c a s e ) . 
The element necessary for allowance under equity and good 
conscience that is consistently lacking in quit to accompany 
spouse cases is element "c", "a denial would be inconsistent with 
the intent of the unemployment insurance program". The Utah 
Employment Security Act itself is specific in denying benefits to 
those who quit to accompany their spouses to new locales. Sec-
tion 35-4-5(a) of the Act provides as follows: 
. . . 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
section, a claimant who has left work volun-
tarily to accompany, follow or join his or 
her spouse to or in a new locality does so 
without good cause for purposes of this sub-
section. 
Granted, the language of the Act is "good cause" language and 
says nothing of equity and good conscience. Nonetheless, the 
language "Notwithstanding any other provision of this section" 
clearly shows the intent of the Legislature to deny benefits in 
quit to accompany spouse cases. 
The Supreme Court has upheld this general statement of leg-
islative intent to deny benefits in situations where jobs are 
left in order to join or accompany spouses. 
. . . It is reasonable for the Legislature to 
determine, as a matter of policy, that the 
state need not underwrite the financial risks 
attendant on such a personal and voluntary 
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choice as the decision to attend school in 
another state. Therefore we hold that this 
classification, established to deny benefits 
to those who voluntarily leave work to follow 
or join a spouse, bears a rational relation-
ship to the legitimate legislative goal of 
limiting unemployment compensation to those 
who become unemployed through no fault of 
their own. Thus, in spite of its unfortunate 
effects on many families, the classification 
offends neither the state nor the federal 
constitution. 
Chandler v, Department of Employment Security, 678 P.2d 315, 318 
(Utah 1984). While Chandler dealt solely with "good cause" and 
the constitutionality of the "quit to accompany spouse" issue3 it 
appears to support the Board's interpretation that the Legisla-
ture intended to deny benefits in these cases. 
The legislative history of §35-4-5(a), paragraph three, 
reveals that the state interest sought to be furthered by its 
enactment is the preservation of the fiscal integrity of the Utah 
Unemployment Compensation Fund. Utah Senate Debate on HB 68, 
January 30, 1982, page 293, House Journal, Day 16. That this is 
a legitimate state interest cannot be doubted. The Legislature 
gave effect to this objective by creating a program to insure 
risks of involuntary unemployment, but not all risks of all un-
employment. 
Unemployment Insurance Rule R475-5a-4 is also specific in 
stating thp direct intent of the Act with regard to providing 
benefits for those who quit to accompany a spouse: 
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1. An individual leaves work without good 
cause, regardless of the reason for the move, 
if he or she quit to move with, follow or 
join, a lawful wife or husband, to or in a 
new place of residence from which it is not 
practical to commute to the employment. Even 
if such necessitous circumstances as the ex-
pense of maintaining two separate households, 
or the need to keep a family together, were 
factors in the decision to move, benefits 
cannot be allowed. The Utah Legislature has 
chosen not to insure this aspect of domestic 
life. The only exception to this provi-
sion is where a claimant quits to accom-
pany a spouse who is compelled to move to 
a new locale for medical reasons which are 
beyond the control of the spouse. 
Clearly, then, those who quit jobs to accompany spouses are 
not entitled to collect unemployment insurance benefits regard-
less of personal mitigating circumstances under the equity and 
good conscience provisions of the Act since element "c" of the 
equity and good conscience standard is not met in those cases as 
the Legislature did not intend individuals who quit employment 
to accompany spouses to be covered under the Act. 
The Board appropriately made no specific factual findings 
under equity and good conscience since it had already reached 
the factual conclusion (affirmed by this Court) that the primary 
reason the claimant quit her job was to follow her spouse. 
CONCLUSION 
Since it is not in keeping with the intent of the Act to 
allow benefits in quit to accompany spouse cases, regardless of 
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reasonable personal mitigating circumstances, it would be inap-
propriate for this matter to be remanded for findings under 
equity and good conscience. The Board of Review of the Indus-
trial Commission of Utah, Department of Employment Security, 
therefore respectfully requests that the Court's decision in 
this matter be amended to omit such a requirement. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of May, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
WINSTON M. FAUX 
EMMA R. THOMAS 
Special Assi stants 
Attorney General 
B y ^ 
Emma R. Thomas 
Attorney for Respondents 
Board of Review 
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